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The ferret transmission model is extensively used to assess 
the pandemic potential of emerging influenza viruses, yet 
experimental conditions and reported results vary among 
laboratories. Such variation can be a critical consideration 
when contextualizing results from independent risk-as-
sessment studies of novel and emerging influenza viruses. 
To streamline interpretation of data generated in different 
laboratories, we provide a consensus on experimental pa-
rameters that define risk-assessment experiments of influ-
enza virus transmissibility, including disclosure of variables 
known or suspected to contribute to experimental variability 
in this model, and advocate adoption of more standard-
ized practices. We also discuss current limitations of the 
ferret transmission model and highlight continued refine-
ments and advances to this model ongoing in laboratories. 
Understanding, disclosing, and standardizing the critical 
parameters of ferret transmission studies will improve the 
comparability and reproducibility of pandemic influenza risk 
assessment and increase the statistical power and, per-
haps, accuracy of this model.
The susceptibility of ferrets to influenza virus infection has been known for nearly a century. Ferrets and hu-
mans share similarities in lung physiology, cellular recep-
tor distribution, and clinical signs of infection, making the 
ferret an attractive small mammalian model for laboratory 
study of influenza viruses (1). Influenza virus infection in 
ferrets emulates the severe disease elicited by highly patho-
genic avian influenza viruses in humans and the transmis-
sibility of seasonal human influenza viruses via respiratory 
droplets. Commonly reported experimental setups for the 
study of influenza virus transmission in ferrets include co-
housing influenza virus–infected and uninfected ferrets 
(previously termed the direct contact model) or physically 
separating virus-infected and uninfected ferrets (previously 
termed the respiratory droplet model or the airborne trans-
mission model) (1,2). In the co-housing design, transmis-
sion between ferrets can be mediated by any of the multiple 
routes that facilitate influenza virus transmission, including 
direct contact, indirect contact via fomites, or via respira-
tory droplets (airborne particles with >5 µm aerodynamic 
diameter) and droplet nuclei (airborne particles with <5 µm 
aerodynamic diameter). In the physical separation design, 
direct or indirect contact between donor and recipient fer-
rets is precluded by separating cages with a side panel or 
cage walls that permit air exchange between cages but pre-
vent direct contact between ferrets. If the recipient ferret 
becomes infected with influenza virus, respiratory droplets 
and droplet nuclei expelled from the donor ferret represent 
the only possible source of transmission. Many influenza 
viruses that cause zoonotic infections in humans (e.g., most 
swine influenza viruses, avian influenza viruses of subtype 
H5N1 and other subtypes) are generally poorly transmitted 
between ferrets via respiratory droplets and droplet nuclei, 
whereas viruses associated with seasonal epidemics or pan-
demics in humans (e.g., influenza A[H1N1]pdm09 virus, 
the reconstructed 1918 virus) can be transmitted relatively 
efficiently (3–7). As such, the ferret model provides a use-
ful tool for research on influenza virus transmission and 
pandemic risk assessment. Influenza transmissibility be-
tween ferrets is a parameter included in tools for assessing 
the potential pandemic risk for zoonotic influenza viruses: 
the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (8) and the World 
Health Organization Tool for Influenza Pandemic Risk As-
sessment (9).
Recent experimental studies performed by using fer-
ret transmission models have greatly expanded knowledge 
of influenza virus transmissibility. Among other findings, 
these studies have identified molecular correlates and de-
terminants of airborne virus spread, differential innate host 
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responses between viruses with distinct transmissible phe-
notypes, and the role of vaccination and antiviral admin-
istration in mitigating virus spread to susceptible contacts 
(2,10–19). Although the ferret model does not always re-
capitulate virus transmissibility observed among humans, 
possibly because of differences in prior exposure history 
and other unidentified host factors, these studies, in isola-
tion and in tandem with additional laboratory experiments, 
have improved our ability to perform informative risk as-
sessments of novel and emerging influenza viruses. For ex-
ample, the limited transmissibility of influenza A(H7N9) 
viruses via airborne particles in ferrets, in the absence of 
sustained human-to-human transmission, indicates that the 
pandemic threat posed by this virus subtype is relatively 
higher than that of other studied avian influenza viruses; 
further refinements to the experimental model may help 
explain why this virus does not currently spread readily be-
tween humans.
Despite the growing use of influenza virus transmis-
sion studies in the field, there is a wide and often under-
appreciated heterogeneity among these studies with regard 
to assessing influenza virus transmissibility via airborne 
particles in the ferret model. This heterogeneity includes 
host-specific, virus-specific, and environmental/laboratory-
specific variables (Table 1) that are a help and a hindrance 
for understanding the relative risk for virus transmission 
with a particular virus strain or subtype (1). Robust data 
can be generated by several independent research groups 
performing parallel studies with genetically similar but not 
identical field viruses. Such an approach reduces potential 
strain-specific or method-specific biases. Conversely, each 
experimental variable may restrict or complicate direct 
comparisons of data from different research groups or in-
stitutions, depending on each variable’s effect on the trans-
mission outcome, making it impossible to combine data. 
Current knowledge about viral, host, and environ-
mental factors that may drive transmission is limited. To 
facilitate interpretation of data generated in different labo-
ratories, efforts should be made to improve transparency 
in descriptions of methods and to better differentiate what 
constitutes a risk-assessment activity versus a research ac-
tivity. After the Transmission of Respiratory Viruses con-
ference, held June 19–21, 2017, in Hong Kong (20), an 
ancillary workshop was held on June 22, 2017, to discuss 
this topic. 
Our article serves as a starting point for highlighting 
potential heterogeneity in ferret transmission experimental 
designs for future refinement. It is not intended as a policy 
statement for detailed recommendations on ferret experi-
mental designs, when the effects of many of these variables 
are not fully understood. We discuss and summarize vari-
ables in the ferret transmission model.
Identifying Variability
Major drivers of variability in studies of influenza virus 
transmissibility include differences in virus strain, dose, 
and inoculation route (21–23). Even when a common virus 
strain is used, results are potentially affected by the passage 
condition (e.g., multiplicity of infection), passage history 
(in embryonated chicken eggs or in mammalian cells), and 
storage condition of the virus. Risk-assessment studies are 
particularly challenging because the evaluations are con-
ducted with recently isolated specimens that are not avail-
able from a central respository before animal inoculation; 
variation pertaining to input stock material is possible even 
when different laboratories have confirmed sequence iden-
tity of the same virus undergoing evaluation. Furthermore, 
several other factors have not been directly demonstrated 
but are likely to contribute to experimental variation in 
transmission studies: cage design, air flow direction, air 
changes per hour, facility-specific temperature and hu-
midity levels, and others (Table 1) (1). Beyond these, ad-
ditional variables, which are largely out of the control of 
researchers, include ferret suppliers (commercial or hobby 
and the quantity of ferrets available from each), country-
specific animal welfare issues, institutional animal care and 
use committee guidelines, and pharmaceutical limitations 
(availability or restriction of anesthetics licensed for use).
Although some factors are considered to be control-
lable, much of the variability between groups cannot be 
easily overcome. For example, the absence of commer-
cially available uniform caging for ferret transmission ex-
periments (a reflection of country- and institution-specific 
size regulations and facilities constraints) represents a pa-
rameter that would be difficult to standardize. However, 
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Table 1. Examples of heterogeneity in experimental designs 
among published risk-assessment studies using ferrets as 
models for influenza virus transmission studies and pandemic 
risk assessments* 
Parameter Examples of variability 
Virus (before ferret 
introduction) 
Seed stock passage history, stock 
growth matrix, stock titer, wild-type vs. 
reverse genetics, plaque-purified vs. 
quasispecies, storage and propagation 
conditions 
Ferret (before virus 
introduction) 
Source/genetic lineage, serostatus, age, 
sex, weight, neutered or intact status, 
hormonal treatment (females), anesthetic 
used, housing conditions 
Virus inoculation Inoculation route, method, dose, and 
volume; buffer for dilution 
Transmission 
experimental designs 
Donor:recipient ratio, number of 
replicates per containment, caging size 
and setup, perforation size and exposure 
area between cages, distance between 
cages, directional airflow, air changes 
per hour, temperature and humidity, 
timing and duration of exposure, 
frequency and sites for sample collection 
*References for individual studies using these conditions are described  
in (1). 
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a greater understanding of the relative role and contribu-
tion of different variables can improve our ability to better 
contextualize and interpret results among laboratories. For 
example, does the virus dose affect transmissibility or oth-
erwise influence detection of transmissible quasispecies in 
contact ferrets? Gustin et al. previously demonstrated the 
potential effects of the dose and the route of inoculation 
(intranasal vs. aerosol) on transmission potential (22), sug-
gesting the need to standardize these 2 parameters for risk-
assessment studies. Similarly, the use of directional airflow 
or air changes per hour in ferret housing apparatuses is not 
always specified in reports of risk-assessment results. An-
ecdotally, these variables seem to play a role in modula-
tion of virus transmissibility, and they should be examined 
systematically to ascertain which parameters (including but 
not limited to those shown in Table 1) would benefit from 
standardization, where possible, across laboratories in the 
field. This standardization and interpretation can take place 
only when all known major drivers of laboratory variabil-
ity that influence virus transmissibility are described along 
with the results.
As discussed at the workshop, the participating labo-
ratories analyzed the protocols used for evaluation of in-
fluenza virus transmissibility via airborne particles in the 
ferret model, which highlighted the breadth of experimen-
tal designs. It was also clear that all variables that are prob-
able contributors to differential results are not routinely 
disclosed in peer-reviewed publications or other platforms 
where results are discussed. Lack of disclosure of all vari-
ables can complicate the ease of comparing findings be-
tween laboratories, warranting a closer look at the feasi-
bility of using a more comparable study design between 
multiple laboratory groups for risk-assessment studies. As 
such, a push toward comprehensive description of specific 
experimental conditions would aid this effort and would 
probably be valuable when risk assessments performed in 
different laboratories are compared.
Defining Risk Assessment
Beyond the experiment- and facility-based variability we 
describe, the lack of a standard protocol for the number of 
experimentally infected animals and the number of recipi-
ent ferrets (donor:recipient ratios) included in ferret trans-
mission studies can affect the ability to interpret results 
among groups and represents a substantial controllable 
parameter. The ideal standard for risk assessment activi-
ties seems to be a 1:1 donor:recipient experimental setup to 
assess virus transmissibility via the airborne route, where 
each virus-infected ferret is exposed to only 1 recipient fer-
ret. This design facilitates ease of interpretation of results 
and provides added rigor from a statistical perspective. 
This design also restricts exposure to virus-laden particles 
expelled from each donor ferret to its respective recipient, 
ensuring that any detected transmission event would have 
originated from exposure to separate donors. However, be-
cause of space limitations, these experiments are often con-
ducted in replicates inside a single physical containment 
area with a shared ventilation system (i.e., housing mul-
tiple pairs of donors and respiratory droplet recipients in 
separate cages with shared air) while still maintaining a 1:1 
donor:recipient ratio. If transmission is mediated by virus-
laden particles expelled by donors, increasing the number of 
donors within a single containment area is likely to increase 
the concentration of virus-laden particles in the air, thereby 
increasing the observed transmissibility. Specifically, it is 
not known whether transmission kinetics would be com-
parable if 3 independent experiments were performed with 
1 donor to 1 recipient (each ferret housed singly) versus 
1 experiment with 3 donors and 3 recipients per contain-
ment area. Air sampling devices that allow monitoring of 
the quantities of virus-laden particles in the air throughout 
the experiment would help refine the experiment outcomes 
and are likely to become part of these experimental designs 
in the future.
Further impeding efforts to compare results among 
laboratories, many experiments include an additional con-
tact ferret co-housed with an experimentally infected ferret 
to evaluate virus transmissibility in a direct contact setting 
while still assessing the respiratory droplet transmission to 
a recipient ferret housed in an adjacent cage. In this design, 
several ferrets may serve as donors (i.e., virus-inoculated 
ferrets, co-housed ferrets that became infected as a result 
of direct/indirect contact, or both). Moreover, the donor 
and direct contact–infected ferrets are likely to shed virus-
laden particles at different times, further complicating the 
results of the transmission experiments. Ideally, the effects 
of different experimental designs should be investigated in 
systematic experiments, and researchers should strive to 
disclose this information as comprehensively as possible.
During workshop discussions, most researchers agreed 
that it would be helpful for the field to coalesce around a 
fixed 1:1 donor:recipient ratio (with or without several dis-
crete pairs inside 1 physical containment area) for risk-as-
sessment transmission experiments. Introduction of direct 
contact ferrets into the experimental setup would probably 
extend the amount of time that virus-laden particles can 
be released in the air. Virus amplification by direct contact 
ferrets may also lead to virus adaptation and emergence of 
variants with increased respiratory droplet transmission po-
tential. Applying a 1:1 donor:recipient ratio would increase 
the consistency of the experimental design under which 
risk-assessment experiments are conducted across multiple 
laboratories, differentiating them from broader, more het-
erogeneous research-based assessments that would include 
more experimental designs and variables. However, indi-
vidual laboratories have built up datasets and experience 
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over the years while performing risk-assessment studies 
with different strains of influenza viruses; thus, adopting 
a common protocol may be difficult to achieve within a 
short time.
Although viruses that are readily transmitted by the 
airborne route will exhibit robust transmission in a direct 
contact setting, some influenza viruses that are not trans-
mitted efficiently via respiratory droplets are nonetheless 
transmitted between ferrets placed in direct contact, which 
facilitates transmission via multiple modes. Studies evalu-
ating virus transmissibility between ferrets placed in direct 
contact may be influenced by many of the experimental 
drivers discussed here; when using this model, further con-
tributions to variability are introduced by animal behavior 
and housing practices. Although scoring for the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention Influenza Risk Assessment 
Tool includes data derived from the direct contact transmis-
sion model in risk assessment, it is not fully clear how to 
interpret the relative pandemic risk resulting from viruses 
that transmit in a direct contact setting but not via respira-
tory droplets. As discussed above, a greater understanding 
of what confers virus transmissibility in both models will 
improve our ability to interpret results from more permis-
sive direct contact models with the more stringent respira-
tory droplet transmissibility. This knowledge will improve 
our ability to appropriately include and aggregate results 
from both types of transmission studies in influenza virus 
risk assessments.
Limitations of the Ferret Transmission Model
Although the ferret transmission model has greatly im-
proved our understanding of influenza virus transmissi-
bility, there are limits to what this model can contribute 
to risk assessment and how results are interpreted. In 
particular, inefficient virus transmission (e.g., when 1 
of 3 recipient ferrets becomes productively infected) re-
mains a difficult outcome to understand. It is often unclear 
whether this event results from genetic changes in the vi-
rus during the transmission event, reflects the transmitted 
infectious dose, or results from other contributing factors; 
concurrent contextualization of these results with other 
laboratory paramaters (inclusive of in vivo, in vitro, and 
aerobiology-based experimentation) can often provide 
additional insight. Similarly, interpretation of seroconver-
sion in the absence of detectable virus in respiratory se-
cretions or detectable virus in the absence of seroconver-
sion can be difficult. Moving toward a consensus on the 
implications of inefficient transmission events would be 
helpful because, currently, efficient and inefficient trans-
mission are not well defined.
Another major limitation of current ferret transmis-
sion studies is the small group size, which is driven by 
cost, size of the animals and their associated housing 
requirements, and ethical and practical constraints. For this 
reason, statistical analyses of data from transmission ex-
periments are infrequently performed (24,25), and repeti-
tion of positive-control viruses is not uniformly feasible. 
Risk assessment studies are often performed with 3–4 
replicates of transmission pairs. With this sample size, it 
is feasible to statistically infer virus transmissibility at the 
extremes of transmission potential (i.e., virus transmission 
to 4 of 4 ferrets versus 0 of 4 ferret pairs), but statistical 
power to compare viruses with intermediate transmissibil-
ity (transmissibility to 2 or 3 of 4 pairs) is limited. The 
opportunity for meta-analyses that combine results from 
different laboratories could be beneficial, especially for 
monitoring minor changes in transmission potential of a 
particular zoonotic virus as it evolves over time. However, 
meta-analyses can be performed only when experiments 
use comparable study designs, especially with regard to 
those parameters known to most dramatically influence vi-
rus transmissibility.
Potential Refinements of the Ferret  
Transmission Model
Great efforts are being made to reduce the limitations dis-
cussed above by using novel and emerging technologies 
and research-based approaches. For identifying muta-
tions that may have occurred during transmission events, 
Sanger sequencing has been frequently used. Recently 
developed technologies (e.g., use of neutral barcodes to 
individually track influenza viruses in a population) or 
deep-sequencing approaches have provided, and probably 
will continue to provide, additional information to aid in 
the interpretation of inefficient virus transmission events, 
elucidate transmission bottlenecks, and differentiate be-
tween within-group variability and larger differences in 
experimental setup and design (26–28). Although incor-
porating viral genome sequencing in all risk-assessment 
studies would be beneficial, the inclusion and standard-
ization of these approaches represents a substantial chal-
lenge with regard to sample choice for testing (types of 
samples, dates of sample collection, titers of samples) and 
institutional restrictions on collection, interpretation, and 
dissemination of this information.
An additional avenue for improved understand-
ing of virus transmissibility via respiratory droplets are 
aerobiology-based approaches. These approaches include 
analysis of the exhaled breath of infected ferrets and the 
amount and size distribution of virus-containing aerosols 
released by infected ferrets (29–31). Although it is un-
likely that aerobiology-based information can be incorpo-
rated into standard risk-assessment ferret experiments, in-
formation gained from these experiments could improve 
our understanding and interpretation of influenza virus 
transmissibility in the ferret model, providing additional 
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data about the contributions of different variables to con-
sistency between laboratories for experiments assessing 
virus transmission.
In vivo ferret transmission studies are not performed 
in isolation. The incorporation of these data into larger re-
search efforts has greatly expanded our understanding of 
the complex determinants of influenza virus transmission 
in mammals. For example, hemagglutinin acid stability 
and the hemagglutinin–neuraminidase balance have been 
linked with virus transmissibility via the airborne route in 
ferrets, as have receptor binding preference, gene constel-
lation, neuraminidase stalk length, and other parameters 
(14–17,28,29). In addition, studies examining the relative 
effects of environmental temperature and relative humidity 
on influenza virus stability and transmissibility (underscor-
ing the need to report this information more specifically in 
published methods sections) will provide needed informa-
tion pertaining to the seasonality of influenza virus spread 
in humans (32,33). Further refinement of the ferret model 
concurrent with studies using other modeling approaches, 
including but not limited to in vitro and ex vivo infection 
models, will continue to support in vivo transmission risk 
assessments in this species.
Moving Forward
The plasticity of the ferret model permits a wide range of 
experimental approaches to assess influenza virus trans-
missibility. This plasticity represents a great advantage 
when designing research experiments to evaluate viral, 
host, environmental, and other factors that contribute to 
transmission between mammals. However, it might be ben-
eficial for studies conducted primarily for risk-assessment 
purposes to be performed under conditions as uniform as 
possible. For example, moving toward a standardized 1:1 
donor:recipient ratio in risk-assessment studies would 
probably enhance the comparability of results found by dif-
ferent research groups and would enable inclusion in meta-
analyses (Table 2).
Current knowledge regarding the viral, host, and en-
vironmental parameters that drive transmission outcomes 
is limited. Understanding these parameters would be ben-
eficial for infection control, and future studies should aim 
to validate these factors empirically. As data regarding the 
exact role of each of the potential parameters discussed 
in this article are developed, improved documentation of 
variables (Table 1) associated with risk assessments would 
facilitate comparison of data generated across different 
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Table 2. Features that may be conducive to uniform, reproducible risk-assessment transmission setups when using ferrets as models 
for influenza virus transmission studies and pandemic risk assessments* 
Property Rationale Sample phrasing 
Perceived 
importance 
Donor:recipient ratio of 1:1 Improved statistical rigor, potential 
application for meta-analysis, and 
interpretation of results. The number of 
donor:recipient pairs housed inside 
containment with shared ventilation 
should be reported. 
“Inoculated ferrets (n = 3) were each placed in 
a separate cage; 24 hours later, naïve ferrets 
(n = 3) were each placed in a different cage 
adjacent to an inoculated ferret.” 
High 
Seronegative ferrets Prior influenza virus exposure history 
can be difficult to quantify and control. 
The methods used for assessing prior 
exposure should be disclosed. 
“Ferrets were serologically negative to currently 
circulating influenza A (H1N1 and H3N2) and B 
viruses before challenge, as confirmed by HI 
assay.” 
High 
Harmonization of 
ventilation and 
environmental conditions 
ACH, directional airflow, cage design, 
humidity/temperature information are 
reported concurrent with release of 
results. 
“Ferrets were housed for the duration of the 
experiment in an environmental chamber with 
HEPA filtration operating at 20 ACH. Airflow 
velocity was found to be negligible between 
donor and recipient cages. Ambient 
temperature (20°–22°C) and relative humidity 
(40%) were monitored during the experiment.” 
High 
Uniform definition of 
efficient transmissibility 
Virus titers (with detection limit) and 
seroconversion are both required to 
demonstrate robust transmission 
event. 
“Virus transmissibility was confirmed by 
detection of infectious virus and by 
seroconversion to homologous virus in recipient 
ferrets.” 
High 
Dose, volume, and route of 
inoculation 
Dose of inoculum may affect the 
transmission kinetics (22). A 
consensus within the risk-assessment 
group may be beneficial. 
“Ferrets were inoculated by the intranasal route 
with 106 PFU of virus in a volume of 500 L” 
High 
Application of air sampling 
device to determine the 
size and quantity of virus-
laden particles in air 
The results may help correlate and 
refine the transmission phenotype. 
“Variables were inclusive of vendor, duration of 
sampling, specification of collection matrices 
(buffers, gelatin[s], etc.), specification of virus 
confirmation via PCR and/or live virus 
detection, normalization correction of data (if 
applicable).” 
Intermediate 
*Discussed at workshop held June 22, 2017, ancillary to Transmission of Respiratory Viruses conference held on June 19–21, 2017, in Hong Kong, China 
(20). ACH, air changes per hour; HEPA, high-efficiency particulate air. 
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laboratories. These should include, but are not limited to, 
stating the stock passage history and storage conditions; 
dose, volume, and route of inoculation; donor:recipient ra-
tio (and the number of donor:recipient pairs present within 
a single containment area); and clarity in describing cage 
setup (coupled with illustrations when possible for easy un-
derstanding of the overall experimental conditions), speci-
fying room and cage humidity/temperature, stating airflow 
directionality when present and air changes per hour, and 
specifying the condition of sample storage and processing 
procedures (e.g., whether samples are titered immediately 
for presence of infectious virus, or whether they are frozen 
and thawed before use).
Many unanswered questions are relevant for understand-
ing the pandemic risk posed by novel and emerging influ-
enza viruses that lie outside a standardized risk-assessment 
experimental setup. Some studies that would provide addi-
tional valuable information include modulation of distance 
between cages when assessing virus transmissibility via the 
airborne route, shortening the duration of exposure between 
inoculated donors and contact ferrets (18,28,34), and modi-
fying the donor:recipient ferret ratio. Performing these types 
of experiments according to a standardized risk-assessment 
evaluation of virus transmissibility could provide valuable 
contextual information for a more nuanced risk assessment. 
Distinguishing between risk assessment and research activi-
ties will greatly facilitate interpretation and contextualization 
of data generated by different laboratories.
A useful exercise might be for several research groups 
to test and compare results of a transmission experiment by 
using 1 selected virus strain prepared by 1 laboratory. Many 
practical considerations would need to be discussed, includ-
ing the particular strain to test and the anticipated transmis-
sion phenotype of this virus. Complete standardization of fer-
ret transmission studies conducted worldwide is not possible; 
however, exercises that seek to examine the relative contribu-
tions of laboratory-specific drivers of experimental variability 
may identify critical parameters or conditions. Similarly, me-
ta-analyses of published data, with included disclosure of the 
parameters listed in Table 1, could aid in our understanding of 
the relative contribution of variables involved in respiratory 
droplet transmission experimentation in ferrets.
Influenza viruses will continue to jump the species 
barrier and cause human infection and disease. Virus-
transmissibility assessments in the ferret model represent 
one of numerous activities conducted to aid pandemic pre-
paredness efforts in the event that a pandemic virus does 
emerge in the future. Continued refinement of the ferret 
model, concurrent with advances in identification of viral, 
host, and environmental factors that influence transmission 
risk (35), will facilitate assessments of novel and emerging 
influenza viruses and aid development of better infection 
control measures.
The workshop was supported by the Theme-based Research 
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